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Coin tossing is a cryptographic task in which two parties who do not trust each other aim to
generate a common random bit. Using classical communication this is impossible, but non trivial
coin tossing is possible using quantum communication. Here we consider the case when the parties
do not want to toss a single coin, but many. This is called bit string generation. We report the
experimental generation of strings of coins which are provably more random than achievable using
classical communication. The experiment is based on the “plug and play” scheme developed for
quantum cryptography, and therefore well suited for long distance quantum communication.
PACS numbers:
Coin tossing is a cryptographic task, introduced by
Blum [1], in which two parties who do not trust one
another aim to generate a common random bit. Coin
tossing is an important primitive that can be used in the
design of other two-party protocols such as mental poker
and mail certification and it could even form the basis
of a scheme for bit commitment that is computationally
secure against quantum attacks [2]. Classically, coin toss-
ing is impossible without computational assumptions: at
least one of the parties can in principle always cheat and
fix the outcome. Using quantum communication, how-
ever, non-trivial coin tossing is possible [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
In many applications, the parties do not want to gen-
erate a single coin, but many. This is called bit-string
generation [10, 11, 12]. Here we report on an experimen-
tal implementation of bit-string generation based on the
“plug and play” scheme developed for Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD) in optical fibers at telecommunication
wavelengths [13]. Using the theoretical analysis of [12]
we are able to show that the bit strings generated in our
experiment achieve a level of randomness impossible clas-
sically. This is the first demonstration of a fundamental
new concept: namely the possibility of generating ran-
dom coins with an adversary who is limited only by the
laws of physics.
The present work focuses on bit string generation
rather than the tossing of a single coin for two rea-
sons. First it is shown in [12] that in principle arbi-
trarily high levels of randomness per bit can be obtained
for bit string generation whereas this is not the case for
coin tossing[8, 9]. Hence bit string generation is more
promising from the point of view of applications. Sec-
ond, present experimental limitations (mainly detector
noise and inefficiency) seem to preclude tossing a single
coin with a level of randomness higher than what is pos-
sible classicaly. This difficulty is illustrated by another
experiment which recently realized some aspects of coin
tossing [14], but for which it was impossible to prove that
a level of randomness impossible classically was achieved.
We begin by reviewing security conditions for the gen-
eration of n random bits. The outcome of the protocol
is either a string of bits ~x ∈ {0, 1}n or one of the parties
aborts, in which case we write ~x =⊥. The protocol is
correct if when both parties are honest, the probability
of aborting is small and all the coins are fair. Mathemat-
ically we express this as
∀~c ∈ {0, 1}n P(~x = ~c) = (1− δn)/2n,
P(~x =⊥) = δn. (1)
It is necessary to include the parameter δn because of ex-
perimental imperfections which induce a non-zero prob-
ability of the protocol aborting even if both parties are
honest. In the protocol we use δn decreases to zero ex-
ponentially fast with n and can be neglected.
We shall use two security conditions. The first, called
the “average bias”, describes the degree of randomness
of individual bits of the string. Formally we define the
upper bound ǫA(B) on the average bias when Alice (Bob)
is dishonest and the other party is honest as:
∀SA∀~c ∈ {0, 1}n 1
n
n∑
i=1
PSAHB (xi = ci) ≤ 1
2
+ ǫA,
∀SB∀~c ∈ {0, 1}n 1
n
n∑
i=1
PHASB (xi = ci) ≤ 1
2
+ ǫB, (2)
where we denote a general strategy of Alice (Bob) by SA
(SB), and the honest strategy defined by the protocol as
HA (HB). Classically, when δn = 0, one has ǫA + ǫB ≥
1/2 [12]. (When δn 6= 0 the classical bound becomes
ǫA + ǫB ≥ 1/2− 2δn.)
The second security condition measures the degree of
randomness of the string taken as a whole. We define
HA(B) as the entropy of the string if Alice (Bob) is dis-
honest and the other party is honest. In [12], bounds on
the entropy are derived for our protocol assuming general
2cheating. However the corresponding classical bound is
not known, although it is conjectured in [12] to be of the
form HA +HB ≤ n + o(n). We refer to [12] for a more
detailed discussion of security conditions and for formal
definitions of HA(B).
The protocol we shall use, inspired by that of [10, 12]
is as follows. Choose a security parameter 0 < κ < 1.
1. For i = 1 to n.
2. Alice chooses a random bit ai. If ai = 0, she pre-
pares a coherent state of the electromagnetic field
with amplitude α: ψ0 = |α〉. If ai = 1, she prepares
a coherent state with amplitude −α: ψ1 = | − α〉.
She sends the coherent state ψai to Bob. After re-
ceiving the quantum state from Alice, Bob chooses
a random bit bi. Bob tells Alice the value of bi.
3. After learning the value of bi, Alice reveals the value
of ai to Bob.
4. Bob now verifies whether the state Alice sent him
is indeed the coherent state |(−1)aiα〉. He does
this by using a Local Oscillator (LO) to carry out
the displacement D(−(−1)aiα). If Alice was hon-
est, the displaced state should be the vacuum state.
Bob checks that this is the case by sending the state
onto a single photon detector. If the detector clicks,
Bob sets ki = 1. If the detector does not click, Bob
sets ki = 0.
5. Next i.
6. If 1
n
∑
i ki > κ, Bob aborts. Otherwise the output
of the protocol is the bit string xi = (ai+bi) mod 2.
When Bob is dishonest his best strategy is to measure
the state sent to him by Alice as soon as he receives it
(i.e., before carrying out step 3 above). One easily shows,
see [12], that
ǫB ≤ sin θ
2
, where cos θ = |〈ψ0|ψ1〉| = e−2|α|
2
. (3)
If Alice is dishonest she may not send Bob the state ψai
but an arbitrary state ρ. In general she may prepare an
entangled state, keeping half of it and sending the other
half to Bob. Furthermore, she may correlate and even
entangle her strategy over different runs. In [12], how-
ever, it is shown that strategies correlated over different
runs cannot help Alice for large n. A bound on ǫA is
proven that depends on the average value of the fidelity
fi = 〈ψai |ρ|ψai〉, as estimated by Bob. Since the proba-
bility that Bob’s detector clicks (assuming his detector is
perfect) is related to the fidelity by P (ki = 1) ≥ 1 − fi,
the result of [12] then implies that, assuming large n, the
bias if Alice is dishonest is bounded by ǫA ≤ F(κ), where
F(x) =
√
x√
2 sin2 θ
+ x
sin2 θ
. Below we show how this relation
must be modified to take into account imperfections in
Bob’s measuring apparatus.
Note that due to such imperfections, Bob’s detector
may click even if Alice is honest. Alice and Bob should
choose κ such that it is larger than the expected number
of clicks if both parties are honest. When this is the case,
the probability δn that the protocol aborts if both parties
are honest decreases exponentially fast to zero and the
protocol is correct.
Our experimental setup, depicted in Fig. 1, is based
on the plug and play system developed for long distance
QKD [13]. The advantage of the plug and play system
is that it constitutes an all-fiber (standard SMF-28), au-
tomatically balanced interferometer, and hence is well
suited to long distance quantum communication. How-
ever the plug and play system has a number of specific
features which must be carefully taken into account.
Bob to Alice and Bob’s cheating. Each round of the
protocol begins with Bob producing a short (20ns) in-
tense (25mW) laser pulse at λ = 1.55µm. The pulse is
split in two by the 50/50 coupler C1. The two pulses
acquire a relative time delay of 100ns and then impinge
with orthogonal polarization on a Polarizing Beam Split-
ter (PBS) whereupon they are sent to Alice. Between
C1 and the PBS, along the long path, are an attenuator,
a 99/1 coupler C2 and a phase modulator. The role of
these elements will be explained later. The relative at-
tenuation of the two pulses is A ≃ 45dB. The first pulse
to reach Alice is intense and contains N0 ≃ 109 photons.
This pulse will play the role of LO. The second pulse
to reach Alice is attenuated and contains AN0 photons.
The second pulse will play the role of signal.
Upon receiving the pulses, Alice measures the intensity
of the signal pulse (using the 80/20 coupler C3 and a
classical detector Dcl) and attenuates both pulses. The
two pulses are reflected by the Faraday mirror and travel
back to Bob. The total attenuation at Alice’s site is A′ ≃
50dB. Thus the two pulses now contain A′N0 and AA′N0
photons respectively. In particular the signal pulse now
contains only a few photons (AA′N0 = |α|2 = O(1)).
Alice also adds a phase φA = aiπ to the signal pulse,
thereby encoding the value of her bit ai.
The fact that Bob provides Alice with the signal state
seems to provide him with some simple cheating strate-
gies. For instance he could provide Alice with a signal
state that is squeezed in phase in order to decrease the
overlap between |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. This apparently allows
him to discriminate much better |ψ0〉 from |ψ1〉 and hence
the value of ai. The role of the attenuation is to prevent
this kind of cheating. Indeed under strong attenuation
any quantum state tends towards a mixture of coherent
states.
To show this we describe the state by its generalized
Wigner function W (q, p, s). We recall that W (s = −1)
is the Q function which is always positive, W (s = 0) is
the Wigner function, and W (s = +1) is the P function.
3LD (1,55 µm) C
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FIG. 1: Optical setup. LD: Laser Diode, Ci (i=1,2,3): Coupler, Att: Attenuator, Φ: phase modulator, FM: Faraday Mirror,
Dcl: classical detector.
If the P function is positive, then the state is a mixture
of coherent states. Under attenuation by A we have (see
[15]): W out(q, p, s) = 1
A
W in( q√
A
, p√
A
, s+A−1
A
) which im-
plies thatW out(s = 1−2A) is positive. This expresses the
fact that for A→ 0 one tends towards a positive P func-
tion. This result can be made more quantitative by sup-
posing that after attenuation we add a small amount of
Gaussian noise with mean number of chaotic photons n.
This affects the Thus attenuation followed by addition of
chaotic photons yields the transformationW out(q, p, s) =
1
A
W in( q√
A
, p√
A
, s−2n+A−1
A
) and in particular if n = A we
have W out(q, p, s = +1) = 1
A
W in( q√
A
, p√
A
, s = −1), i.e.
the output P function is positive since it is given in terms
of the input Q function. Thus after strong attenuation,
say A = 10−3, a quantum state is very well approximated
by a mixture of coherent states since a very small amount
of Gaussian noise with mean number of chaotic photons
n = 10−3 transforms the state into a mixture of coherent
states.
Another simple cheating strategy is for Bob to increase
the intensity of the signal state since it is then much
easier for him to estimate the phase φA. The role of
the classical intensity measurement is to ensure that the
signal state Alice sends back is not too intense. In fact it
is impossible for Bob to exploit the fact that he provides
Alice with the light pulse which will become the signal
state, since by measuring the intensity of the pulse Bob
sends her and then attenuating it, Alice ensures that she
sends back to Bob a coherent state of known intensity.
Note that the classical intensity measurement of Alice
will be affected by noise because AN0 is close to the sensi-
tivity limit of Alice’s detector. We circumvent this tech-
nical problem by letting Alice carry out statistical tests
on the n intensity measurements (one for each round of
the protocol). More precisely she checks whether the
distribution of measured intensities is consistent with
the Gaussian distribution she expects from instrumen-
tal noise. If it is she has a precise estimate of |α|2, and
hence of ǫB through eq. (3). If it is not she aborts.
From Alice to Bob and Alice’s cheating. Upon receiv-
ing the two pulses from Alice, Bob uses coupler C2 to
measure the intensity of the LO, attenuates it by A, and
A0
Φ1 η D
|Ψ〉
|β〉
a a′
b
c
d′ d
R, T
FIG. 2: Optical setup equivalent to Bob’s measurement, in-
cluding its imperfections.
adds a phase eiφB , with φB = aiπ. Note that by measur-
ing the intensity of the LO state provided by Alice and
then attenuating it, Bob ensures that the LO he uses is a
coherent state (or a mixture of coherent states) of known
intensity |β|2. (The argument is exactly the same as that
given above in the case of Alice).
Let us consider the two states that interfere at coupler
C1. On the one hand there is the LO which as we have
just argued is a coherent state of known intensity |β|2.
On the other hand there is the signal state. The signal
state travels through the PBS where it gets attenuated
by A0. It then interferes with the LO at coupler C1.
This coupler has transmission and reflection coefficients
T and R (both are approximately 50%). Finally one of
the outputs of the coupler is sent to a single photon detec-
tor (id Quantique) with efficiency η. In our experiment
A0T = 4.3dB and η = 10.5%. We can therefore model
the whole of Bob’s detection system by the scheme de-
picted in Fig. 2. It is composed of the LO (a coherent
state of amplitude β), the signal state Ψ, the attenuator
A0, a beam splitter with transmission and reflection co-
efficients T and R. The imperfect detector is modeled by
an attenuation of η followed by a perfect detector.
Let us denote by α the amplitude of the coherent state
that would give rise to destructive interference at the
single photon detector. It satisfies α
√
A0T + iβ
√
R =
0. When ai = 0, the state Alice should send if she is
honest is the coherent state |α〉. (If ai = 1 she should
send the state | − α〉. By using the phase modulator
Bob can cancel this phase). But if Alice is dishonest she
will send another state |Ψ〉. We expand |Ψ〉 in the basis
of displaced Fock states |Ψ〉 = Da(α)
∑
n cn|n〉 where
Da(α) is the displacement operator acting on mode a, ie.
4Da(α)aDa(α)
† = a − α, and |n〉 = (a†)n/
√
n!|0〉 are the
Fock states. The fidelity of the state sent by Alice is thus
f = |〈α|Ψ〉|2 = |c0|2.
We model the effect of the attenuation by the trans-
formation a → √A0a′ +
√
1−A0e1 where e1 is a mode
of the environment; the effect of the BS by the transfor-
mations a′ →
√
Td′ − i
√
Rc, b→
√
Tc− i
√
Rd′; and the
effect of the detector inefficiency by d′ → √ηd+√1− ηe2
where e2 is another mode of the environment (the modes
a, a′, b, c, d′, d are all described in the figure). One then
finds that the state just before entering the single pho-
ton detector is Dc(γ)
∑
n
cn√
n!
[
√
A0Tηd
† + i
√
A0Rc
† +√
1−A0e†1 +
√
(1 − η)TA0e†2]n|0〉 where γ = β
√
T +
iα
√
A0R. From this one easily computes that the proba-
bility that the detector does not register a single click is
P (no click) =
∞∑
n=0
|cn|2(1 −A0Tη)n. (4)
The probability of registering a click is thus bounded by
P (click) ≥ (1 − |c0|2)A0Tη. Thus the number of clicks
on Bob’s detector divided by A0Tη gives a bound on the
fidelity |c0|2.
A final inefficiency that must be taken into account is
that Bob’s detector will have a non-zero dark count rate
κdark = 9 10
−4. Putting all this together we deduce the
bound on the average bias if Alice is dishonest:
ǫA ≤ F(κ− κdark
A0Tη
) (5)
Note that this bound on ǫA is given entirely by parame-
ters which can be measured by Bob.
Using this protocol, and taking into account experi-
mental imperfections as described below, a typical run of
our experiment generates 107 coins. Some results for dif-
ferent values of |α|2 are presented in Fig. 3. For instance
when |α|2 = 0.03, we obtained ǫA + ǫB = 0.32 ± 0.04,
which is significantly better than the classical bound
ǫA + ǫB ≥ 1/2.
An important property of this protocol and of its ex-
perimental implementation is that we do not have to
make any hypothesis about the Hilbert space Alice or
Bob use if they are dishonest -for instance it is not nec-
essary to restrict them to the single photon subspace-,
nor do we have to make any hypothesis about the kind
of technology they can use if they are dishonest. Thus
the randomness of the bit string when one of the parties
is dishonest is guaranteed by the laws of physics.
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FIG. 3: Measured bounds on average bias and on entropy of
bit strings for different values of the average photon number
α2. Open squares: bounds on ǫB obtained using eq. (3); open
circles: bounds on ǫA obtained using eq. (5): filled squares:
bounds on ǫA + ǫB . Classically the sum is always greater
than 1/2. The bit strings are clearly more random than is
allowed by the best classical protocol. The same expressions
which give bounds on ǫA, ǫB also give lower bounds on the
entropies HA(B) of the bit string if Alice (Bob) is dishonest
(see [12]). Filled triangles: bounds on the entropy per bit
(HA +HB)/n. It is conjectured in [12] that for any classical
protocol (HA + HB)/n is bounded by 1 for large n. The
experimental points are clearly above this bound. The error
bars for ǫA+ ǫB and (HA+HB)/n describe systematic errors
arising from incorrect callibration of detector efficiency η and
incorrect estimation of α2. The plotted curves are theoretical
predictions based on the observed optical visibility of 96.5%.
For ǫB the curve is given by eq. (3) and for ǫA it is given by
eq. (5) using the fact that for small α2, (κ− κdark)/A0Tη ≃
(1− V )α2/2.
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